He claimed that probable reasoning could result in sufficient certainty for moral action when an action could be shown to be more probably good than either inaction or an opposed action.
Since our task is to investigate the relationship between moral theory and the question of the moral standing of animals, seeking a position of reflective equilibrium on the issue, it will be useful to have a rough idea at the out-set of what our common-sense morality tell us about the status and appropriate treatment of animals.
For it is plain that morality is not just another special interest, like stamp-collecting, that people may or may not have. But all will agree that gratuitous suffering - suffering caused for no good reason - is wrong.
Conversely resolute selfishness and self-partiality are not the best course for self-love. On such an account, indeed, knowledge that someone has done something wrong can be just as much a matter of ordinary, sensory perception as is the knowledge that they are seated on a chair.
The suffering we inflict on the animals while they are alive is perhaps an even clearer indication of our speciesism than the fact that we are prepared to kill them. Since our task is to investigate the relationship between moral theory and the question of the moral standing of animals, seeking a position of reflective equilibrium on the issue, it will be useful to have a rough idea at the out-set of what our common-sense morality tell us about the status and appropriate treatment of animals.
At any rate, this is what I propose to assume - that all mammals and birds are genuinely sentient, but that no insects are. The idea would be that all subjects-of-a-life have a value that inheres in them independently of our knowledge or existence.
Grief, no matter how debilitating, is not terminal. While it is true that I am sitting at a table, and hence true that individual tables really exist, the difference between tables and other types of thing is not itself a part of the real world. This would explain why we feel it is necessary to save the child drowning in front of us, but not the one starving half a world away.
But either way, fully justifying a moral belief must involve showing how it may be integrated into a moral theory whose governing conception and basic normative principles are each acceptable after rational reflection.
The human family is no different. Yet others would allow them to be killed only to protect legitimate human interests, as when rabbits are shot to prevent crop damage.
Finally, consider the use of animals in painful scientific experiments, particularly those connected with the development and testing of new medicines. There have been a number of responses to Sturgeon.
They should be orphans to rule out the question of vicarious suffering caused to parents and relatives.
They can claim that our habit of taking human suffering more seriously than the comparable suffering of an animal has been formed in circumstances in which human suffering normally does but animal suffering does not interfere with the pursuit of higher pleasures.
Suppose we agree, with Singer, that equal suffering counts equally. Selfishness and self-partiality often mix with benevolent motivations to give rise to benevolent and even compassionate actions Sermon V Note 1. Butler readily admitted that the psychological process that gives rise to compassion included both pleasure in the fact that we were not suffering the distress as well and awareness of our own susceptibility to the ills prompting distress in the object of our compassion.
I do in fact believe, however, that most of those philosophers who have supported the weak subjectivist line have only done so because they have failed to distinguish between two different strengths of objectivism.
If moral values really exist in the objective world, then they must be very peculiar entities indeed. This was a regulating principle of action, perhaps distinct from benevolent passions.
N2 principles are relational, i. As we shall see later, there are a number of powerful constraints on the acceptability of moral theories, besides internal consistency. the prima facie moral obligation to try to mitigate unnecessary, avoidable and unjustified Why are similar harms morally significant in some cases but not in others?
Regan’s argument implicitly implies that only when an action is The Case for Intervention in Nature on Behalf of Animals.
In arguing that there is an absolute moral obligation to disclose even a suspicion of HIV positivity, in effect, one is arguing that most cases of HIV transmission are not just cases of harm to others but wrongs or serious injustices to others.
Cohen’s argument that animals don’t have rights: 1) The attributes of human beings that give rise to their ability to make moral claims against others are lacking in animals.
These and each of us has a moral obligation to cease supporting the practice.”. Thinking, rightly, that strong objectivism is to be rejected, they have believed themselves thereby committed to some version of subjectivism. But this is a mistake. There remains the possibility of a weak objectivist interpretation of morality, as we shall see shortly.
would we have been under a moral obligation to try to prevent her? Let. The first argument against mental immaterialism is that, if mental events are non-physical, then we shall be required to recognize a whole new species of causality, hitherto unknown to science. All the types of causal relationship that science has given us reason to believe in - chemical, electrical, mechanical, and so on - relate different.
Morality Final Exam. Stupid Dumb Class I hate and I want to exterminate from the planet. then in some cases there is no obligation to carry that fetus for 9 months until birth 3. Therefore, even if fetuses are fully human, abortion can be morally acceptable in some cases Explain Singer's main argument against speciesism and note its.An argument against the moral obligation to prevent the sufferings of others in all cases